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iAbstract
The aim of the paper is twofold. In the first place, to find an explanation for the mismatch
phenomena which can be found on the labour market by emphasising the nontransparency
of the labour market. In the second place, to derive an objective mismatch measure, which
enables to investigate the quality of the match between occupations and types of education
and to find that particular type of education which has a comparative advantage in the
occupation concerned. The result is a theoretical model in which concave earnings-trainin
profiles are derived. Initial wages indicate the quality of the match. Training is used to
decrease the mismatch between acquired and required skills.
By estimating earnings function by occupational level and occupational field the theoretical
framework has been tested empirically. The hypothesis that the earnings-tenure profile is
concave can be confirmed by the estimates. Furthermore, the estimates of the mismatch
measure yield attractive results, especially concerning the quality of the match between
occupational and educational levels. Finally, estimating a training function confirms the
hypothesis that training efforts are positively related to the degree of mismatch. So, it may
be concluded that the approach which has been developed in this paper yields a useful
mismatch measure.
1. Important contributions to the development of the job matching theory have, for example, been
made by Tinbergen (1956), Jovanovic (1979) and Hartog (1992). An overview can be found in
Sattinger (1993).
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1 Introduction
Estimating the earnings function and explaining differences in earnings are important
issues in economic literature. For a great deal, research on these topics is based on the
human capital theory. The human capital theory focuses on supply characteristics. Ability,
education and training are the determinants of the amount of human capital an individual
possesses and, as a result, of an individual's productivity in a job. Embedded in a neoclas-
sical framework, the human capital theory implies that a higher ability, more education an
more training do not only result in a higher productivity level, but also yield higher earnings.
Within this human capital tradition, Mincer's (1974) earnings function plays an important
role (Willis, 1986). Mincer's earnings function assumes earnings to be determined by the
amount of formal education (often in years) and experience. Experience is assumed to
have a positive effect on earnings, because, during their career, individuals increase their
amount of human capital by means of on-the-job and formal vocational training. The
experience-earnings profile is assumed to be concave, reflecting that age has a negative
effect on the amount of additional training, because of the negative effect of age on the
rate of return on training.
The human capital theory implies that earnings are merely determined by supply characte-
ristics. The productivity level, and hence earnings, is not influenced by job characteristics.
This feature of the human capital theory has caused serious criticism. In Thurow's (1975)
job competition model the productivity and earnings are merely determined by job charac-
teristics. This implies that individual characteristics play no role in a worker's productivity in
a particular job. They do play a role, however, in the selection of workers for a job. More
human capital implies a better trainability, that is lower training costs in order to achieve the
required productivity level in the job. In other words, more human capital (that is, more
education) improves the opportunities to find a well-paid job.
While the human capital theory focuses on supply characteristics and the job competition
model focuses on job characteristics to explain earnings, job matching theory concentrates
on both. On the one hand, the demand side of the labour market is assumed to consist of1
jobs with different skill requirements. On the other hand, the supply side consists of indivi-
duals who have acquired skills by means of education and training. The job matching
theory states that the quality of the match (that is, the degree of alignment betwee
required and acquired skills) determines the productivity level and earnings in a job. The
better the match, the higher the productivity level is and the higher earnings are. As a
2. In Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden (1995) and Ooster-
beek and Webbink (1996) similar results can be found for the Dutch labour market.
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result, the allocation of workers over jobs becomes very important. If a worker lacks the
required skills, his productivity will be lower than if he is employed in a job in which his skills
are perfectly in alignment with the requirements. Furthermore, this worker achieves a lower
productivity level than a worker with the accurate skills for the job concerned. In order to
describe the optimal allocation of workers over jobs according to the job matching theory,
the concept of comparative advantage has been introduced (Sattinger, 1975). The
allocation is optimal if a worker is allocated to a job in which he performs relatively the best
compared to the other workers.
Although both employers and workers benefit from a perfect match between required and
acquired skills, mismatch is a phenomenon which can often be observed in practice. With
regard to the Dutch labour market, for example, Gelderblom, 't Hoen and De Koning (1994)
show that 13 percent of the workers are employed in a job which is not in alignment with
the subject of study, 4 percent works above and 12 percent below their educational level.
Van de Loo, Hoevenberg en Van der Velden (1995) show that 19 percent of the employed
school-leavers of Higher Vocational Education who graduated in 1993 consider the
alignment between required and acquired skills to be insufficient. Finally, Groot and Maas-
sen-van den Brink (1996) state that in 1995 about 12 percent of the labour force is unde-
reducated, while even more than 24 percent are overeducated.
In the job matching literature attention has been paid to the consequences of a mismatch
between required and acquired skills on the rate of return on education. These studie
focus on the effect of the educational level. Cohn and Khan (1995) give an overview of
these studies. They conclude that the rate of return on years of under- and overeducation
is much lower than the rate of return on years of required education.  This implies that, in a2
particular job, the undereducated earn much less, while the overeducated earn only slightly
more than the workers whose educational level is in alignment with the requirements.
These findings illustrate the concept of comparative advantage. Although overeducated
workers, for example, earn more than adequately educated workers, they would have
earned more in a job in which the educational requirements are higher and more in
alignment with the skills they offer.
This paper links up with the job matching literature in general and the studies considering
the earnings effect of a mismatch mentioned above in particular. The aim of the paper is
twofold. In the first place, to find an explanation for the mismatch phenomena mentioned
above by investigating the consequences of the nontransparency of the labour market for
the recruitment policy of firms. Secondly, to find a measure for the quality of the match
between occupations and types of education.
3. Howitt (1988) and Layard et al. (1991) describe search models, in which the search costs are
an increasing function of the tension on the labour market.
4. To be precise, an imperfect match yields also costs caused by the productivity loss, as long
as the worker is not able to achieve the desired productivity level.
5. Note that this explanation implies that formal education and job-related training are substi-
tutes.
6. The model presented in this paper differs from other matching models. Most matching
models assume, following Jovanovic (1979), that the quality of the match improves with
experience as a result of job mobility. In this paper job-related training yields a better match
between the worker's skills and the required skills.
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The first aim is to find an explanation for the occurrence of mismatches. If the labour
market functions perfectly, an optimal allocation of heterogeneous workers with regard to
their educational background over heterogeneous jobs (occupations) can be the only result
of the decisions of welfare-maximising agents. This implies that, if it is assumed that agents
maximise welfare, a mismatch indicates an imperfect functioning of the market. This paper
focuses on the nontransparency of the labour market as an explanation for a nonoptimal
allocation with regard to the skills acquired and required. If the labour market is not
transparent, employers have to search for workers whose skills (educational background)
are in alignment with the requirements for the job (occupation) concerned and who are able
to achieve the optimal productivity level (that is, the profit-maximising productivity level).
This search process yields costs. However, if workers lack skills, they are not able to3
achieve the productivity level the 'perfectly matching worker' achieves. In this paper it i
assumed that employers train their workers in order to bring undereducated workers on the
optimal productivity level in the occupation concerned. This implies that the costs to find the
'perfectly matching worker' with the perfect educational background may be higher than the
training costs to bring the 'imperfectly matching worker' on the optimal productivity level. In4
other words, the cost-minimising employer may decide to recruit a worker who does not
have the required skills and to train this worker in order to enable him to achieve the
optimal productivity level.5
This explanation for the occurrence of mismatches implies that the quality of the match
improves with job tenure. The longer a worker is mployed, the more job-related training he
has obtained and the higher his productivity level will be. It is reasonable to assume that6
this productivity gain is reflected in the earnings. In this paper an earnings model based on
Mincer (1974) is introduced in a job-related context in order to describe the impact of job-
related training on the productivity and the earnings in an occupation. This model yields
tenure-earnings profiles which are linked with both occupational and educational
background characteristics. In other words, elements of the human capital theory are
introduced in a job matching context in order to describe the improving quality of the match
between the required skills in an occupation and the skills which a worker, with a particular
educational background has acquired, over time. Furthermore, note that in the long run
(that is, if the mismatches have been eliminated by means of training), the model described
4shows much resemblance with Thurow's (1975) job competition model. Training is used to
bring a worker on the optimal productivity level which is assumed to be linked with the job.
In order to find evidence for the explanation for the occurrence of mismatches given in this
paper, the link between training efforts and the quality of the match is also investigated
empirically. 
In the short run, however, the quality of the match determines the productivity level and,
therefore, earnings. This brings us to the second aim of the paper. Most of the studies
dealing with the effect of under- and overeducation on the rate of return on education
mentioned above suggest that the undereducated earn much less, while the overeducated
earn only slightly more than workers whose educational level is in alignment with the
requirements (Cohn and Khan, 1995). A crucial element of these studies is the way in
which the 'optimal' level and, consequently, under- and overeducation are defined. Several
methods can be distinguished. Both Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988) and Sloane et l.
(1995) mention two methods. The first method consists of the evaluation of jobs by job
analysts. The second method extracts information from the individual worker by asking to
specify the type of education required for adequate performance in the job. A third method
uses data on the educational background of workers employed in a particular occupation.
Cohn and Khan (1995), for example, use the worker's mean educational level as a mea-
sure for the optimal level. These methods reveal an important weakness of these studies;
the optimal level, under - and overeducation are defined by means of subjective or indirect
methods, which focus on determining the 'optimal' level.
As a result, these rate of return studies are restricted. First, the quality of the match can not
be determined objectively. Second, the methods which are used to determine the optimal
educational level and over- and undereducation imply that they are not able to measure the
degree of over- and undereducation. Therefore, often this problem is avoided by making
the assumption that the rate of return on education is not related to the degree of under- or
overeducation. An overview of these studies can be found in Cohn and Khan (1995).
Studies in which the rate of return indeed is related to the degree of over- and
undereducation (for example Sloane et al., 1995), the degree of over- and undereducation
is predetermined by means of a subjective or indirect method mentioned above.
Freeman (1976) has stated that a decline in earnings for workers with a particular educa-
tional background indicates that more workers are overeducated compared to the requi-
rements in their jobs. This implies that Freeman has used earnings as a measure for
overeducation. This idea is also used in this paper. A model is formulated which enables to
define a measure for the quality of the match between occupations and types of education.
This model heavily relies on the estimates of the rate of return studies mentioned before.
The line of reasoning is reversed, however. In the rate of return studies mentioned above,
the link between the quality of the match and the rate of return, which is made in the job
matching theory, has been used to determine the rate of return, given the (exogenously
5determined) quality of the match. In this paper this link is used to determine the quality of
the match. In this context, the initial wage (that is, the wage earned if a worker has no
experience in the occupation concerned) is used as a measure for the rate of return on the
worker's type of education in the occupation concerned. Estimates for this initial wage are
obtained by estimating the tenure-earnings profile. With the asymmetric effect of under-
and overeducation on earnings mentioned by Cohn and Khan (1995) in mind, this initial
wage yields a monetary measure for the quality of the match between the type of education
and the occupation concerned. Furthermore, this approach yields the opportunity t
introduce into the analysis both the educational and the occupational level on the one hand
and the subject of types of education and the occupational field on the other hand.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2 the theoretical
earnings model is described. Starting-point for this model is the assumption that the labour
market is not transparent. The model describes the relation between the quality of the
match, earnings and the training efforts. Furthermore, a comparison is made between th
earnings model on the one hand and the job matching theory, the human capital theory
and the job competition model on the other hand. The earnings model yields a monetary
measure (that is, a measure based on earnings) for the quality of the match between
occupations and types of education. In section 3 a model dealing with the link between th
quality of the match between types of educations and occupations, that is the degree of
alignment between acquired and required skills and the monetary measure is formulated.
Section 4 transforms the theoretical model into an empirical model. In section 5 a short
description is given of the data used in the empirical analyses. In section 6 the results of
the estimations are presented and discussed. In the first place, we compare, following
Hartog (1985), the performance of the earnings model based on the assumption that both
occupational and educational background characteristics determine earnings (job matching
theory) with the performance of the more restricted models. These more restricted models
include, respectively, occupational (job competition model) and educational background
characteristics only (human capital theory). Secondly, the estimates of the tenure-earnings
profiles by occupational level are presented. These estimates yield measures for th
degree of under- and overeducation of workers. Thirdly, this profile is estimated by occu-
pational field. By means of these estimation the subject of study is introduced in the
analysis. Finally, the link between training efforts and the quality of the match is discussed
using the estimation results of the earnings function by occupational level. Investigating this
link empirically enables to underpin the earnings model of section 2. In section 7 the paper
is rounded off with some concluding remarks.
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7. Note that labour is assumed to be the only production factor. This assumption is made for
reasons of simplicity.
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2  The relation between the quality of the match, earnings and training
2.1 Introduction
In section 1 it is stated that it is possible to explain the occurrence of mismatches between
required skills in a job and the acquired skills by a worker by means of introducing job-
related training in a nontransparent labour market. This results in an earnings model in
which the mismatch is a decreasing function of job tenure. In this section this model is
formulated. First, attention is paid to the theoretical framework which describes the relation
between the quality of the match, earnings and the training efforts. In the second place, an
alternative interpretation of the earnings model, in terms of the human capital theory, the
job competition model and the matching theory, is given. Finally, this framework is forma-
lised in a model.
2.2 The theoretical framework
The starting-point for the analysis is the following production function describing the
production technology of a price-taking and profit-maximising firm:7
(2.1)
in which  reflects the production volume and  indicates the number of workers em-
ployed in occupation . If the price of the commodity the firm produces is equal to  nd
the wage  is paid to the workers, according to the occupation they practise, the profit
function  of the firm looks as follows:
(2.2)
Maximising profit yields the following occupational labour demand function:
(2.3)
The educational background of those employed by the firm in the various occupations
plays no role in this model. This feature of the model implies that either the assumption is
made that individuals are allocated to that occupation in which their skills can be used
Lj8. By making the second assumption  does not reflect the number of people employed in an
occupation, but the perfect equivalent of that number.
9. It should be noted that the assumption is made that the nontransparency of the market does
not reveal in an imperfect knowledge of the degree of alignment between types of education
and occupations.
10. Recruiting an imperfectly matching worker yields another type of costs. Because the worker
lacks the required skills there is a productivity loss. Within the job in which the worker is
employed, this is not a problem because the wage is lower also. But the productivity loss has
consequences within other occupations also. As a result, recruiting an imperfectly matching
worker has spill-overs to other occupations. Although these costs may be an important
incentive for firms to train new workers these spill-overs are not taken into account in this
paper. The analysis is partial.
7
optimally or that individuals with a different educational background are perfect substitutes
within an occupation.8
In this paper a model is formulated in which both assumptions are not valid. Dropping the
assumption that individuals are perfect substitutes implies that the firm maximises profit by
finding the perfectly matching workers for their jobs. However, in section 1 it was stated that
in an imperfect labour market, recruiting workers whose skills are not in alignment with th
requirements may be a profit-maximising strategy. In this paper we focus on the
consequences of the nontransparency of the labour market for the recruitment policy of
firms. Therefore, the assumption that workers are perfectly allocated over the various
occupations is also dropped here. The focus is on explaining the occurrence of mismatches
between the educational background of workers and the occupations in which they are
employed on the one hand and on investigating the consequences of these mismatches on
the other hand.
If the labour market is not transparent, finding the worker whose educational background is
such that his skills are in alignment with the skills required in the occupation may not be an
easy job. Searching for the perfectly matching worker yields costs, especially if the per-9
fectly matching worker is hard to find. Howitt (1988) and Layard et al. (1991), for example,
describe search models in which the search costs are an increasing function of the tension
on the labour market. However, recruiting an imperfectly matching worker, who may be
much easier to find, implies that training costs have to be made in order to tide over the
gap between acquired and required skills. The profit-maximising firm aims to minimise the10
costs of recruiting and training a new worker. This can imply that an imperfect match may
be cost-minimising for the firm; in that case the search costs which have to be made to find
the perfectly matching worker are higher than the total of the search and training costs
which have to be made to make the imperfectly matching worker suitable for his job. This
implies also that education and training are substitutes. If the skills acquired by education
are insufficient, on-the-job and formal job-related training can be used as an alternative.
Wij i
j t
8
The consequence of the fact that recruiting an imperfectly matching worker can be a cost-
minimising strategy is that the equations (2.1) to (2.3) can be considered to be a long run
model. If the assumption is made that a firm trains a new worker who lacks the skills
required in order to make him as productive as the worker whose skills match perfectly, th
equation (2.1) to (2.3) describe the profit-maximising long run labour demand by
occupation.
In the short run, however, a mismatch results in a lower productivity. Training is needed to
enable the new worker to achieve the optimal productivity level according to the long run
model. As job tenure increases, productivity increases as a result of the training efforts. If
the assumption is made that a worker is paid according to his productivity, figure 2.1 may
be a good description of the effect of the quality of the match on the wage.
Figure 2.1
The quality of the match and the wage
Figure 2.1 shows that the wage  paid to a worker with educational background 
employed in occupation  is an increasing function of job tenure . The positive slope of
the tenure-wage profile reflects the effect of job-related training on the quality of the match
and on the productivity level. Figure 2.1 shows also that the tenure-wage profile is concave;
the training efforts and, as a result, the wage gain, are assumed to be a decreasing
function of job tenure. This is a well-known finding in studies dealing with estimating these
profiles (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). In the context of this paper, the following explanation
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can be given for the concavity of the profile (Mincer, 1989). Training yields a productivity
gain. The faster, the training is completed the longer a firm can benefit from a higher
productivity and a worker can benefit from a higher wage. The longer the training which is
required to improve the quality of the match is postponed, the higher the total productivity
(and wage) loss due to the imperfect match will be. Therefore, there is an incentive for both
firms and workers to concentrate the training efforts immediately after the recruitment.
However, in order to enable a worker to benefit from learning-by-doing also, the training
efforts wil not take all at once. This results in a training pattern in which training efforts
decrease with job tenure.
The tenure-wage profile of figure 2.1 may be described by the following earnings function:
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) contains three parameters. First,  which is the wage paid to the worker
whose educational background matches perfectly with the skills required for occupation .
It is the wage which can also be found in the equations (2.2) and (2.3) of the long run
model. The worker, whose educational background was not in alignment with the skills
required, but who has been trained to achieve the same productivity level as the perfectly
matching worker, also receives the wage  in the long run.
In the second place,  reflects the degree of mismatch between type of education 
and occupation . If a new worker is recruited (that is, ), his wage  is:
(2.5)
Equation (2.5) implies that  measures the gap between the wage paid to the perfectly
matching worker and the wage paid to a worker with educational background  without
experience in occupation  . Therefore, it can be considered to be a monetary mea-
sure for the skills this worker lacks to make him suitable for occupation .  is a
decreasing function of the quality of the match. The better the quality of the match, the
lower . Figure 2.2 shows two tenure-wage profiles. It shows that ; the
quality of the match between type of education  and occupation  is better than the
quality of the match between type of education  and occupation . Therefore,
; for workers employed in occupation , the initial wage for the workers with
education background  is higher than for the workers with educational background .
Finally,  determines the degree of concavity of the tenure-wage profile. In the context
of this paper, it measures the rapidity of the increase in productivity. In other words, the
higher , the faster the gap between acquired and required sk lls is closed. Therefore, in
this paper  is considered to be a learning ability index. It is a measure for a worker's
i
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11. See section 5 for more details.
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learning ability. The higher  the learning ability, the  more effective  on-the-job and  formal
job-related 
 
Figure 2.2
Types of education and the quality of the match
training are and the higher the productivity gain of a particular amount of training will be.
The
learning ability is assumed to be determined by the educational background .  Figure 2.311
shows two tenure-wage profiles. It shows that ; the learning ability of workers
with educational background  is lower than the learning ability of workers with educational
background .
The earnings function (2.4) can be related to the human capital theory, the job competition
model and the job matching theory by distinguishing three stages in which the earnings
function takes a different form. As stated before, if , the earnings function looks as
follows:
(2.5)
Equation (2.5) implies that the quality of the match determines the wage earned in occu-
pation . This implies that, if , the earnings function fits in the job matching theory. Both
worker and job characteristics are related to earnings. If the worker has some experience in
0 < t <4
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the job (that is, if ), training increases productivity and, as a re ult, earnings. The
earnings function looks as follows:
(2.4)
Figure 2.3
Types of education and learning ability
Equation (2.4) implies that supply characteristics (the worker's training efforts and learning
ability) determine the increase in earnings. Therefore, if , the earnings function
fits in the human capital theory in a job-related context. Finally, in the long run (that is, if
), the earnings function looks as follows:
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) implies that, in the long run, job characteristics determine the wage. There-
fore, if , the earnings function fits in the job competition model.
2.3 The earnings model
In this subsection the theoretical framework describing the relation between the quality of
the match, earnings and training efforts will be formalised in a model. The model presented
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12. See Mincer (1974), chapter 5.
13. See section 5 for more details.
14. Note that the rate of return is related to the educational background only. The occupation in
which the worker is employed plays no role. In other words, the assumption is made that the
effectiveness of training is not related to the context in which training takes place.
15. This specification is one of four alternatives presented by Mincer (1974).
12
here is a variant of Mincer's (1974) human capital earnings function. Starting point is the12
following continuous earnings function:
(2.7)
in which  is the wage paid to a worker with educational background  employed in
occupation  with job tenure ,  are the training costs made after  years of job tenure
and  is the rate of return on training. Equation (2.7) differs in two ways from the earnings
function used by Mincer. In the first place, the earnings are related to both the educational
background and the occupation in which the worker is employed, while Mincer uses a
human capital function in which only educational characteristics can be found. Secondly,
Mincer uses the term 'earnings capacity' instead of earnings. Because in this paper it is
assumed that the firm bears the training costs, the distinction between earnings capacity
and earnings is not relevant here.13
Mincer assumes that the rate of return is a decreasing function of age. In this paper, the
rate of return   is assumed to be related to the quality  of the training and the learning
ability  of the worker with educational background :
(2.8)
Both determinants are positively related to the rate of return on training. The higher th
learning ability, the more effective the training will be. The quality (or effectiveness) mea-
sure  can be interpreted in two ways. In the first place as a direct measure of the quality
of the trainig course and, secondly as a measure of the degree of alignment between the
skills acquired in the training concerned and required skills. In both cases the rate of return
is an increasing function of the quality.14
Finally, an assumption has to be made with regard to the allocation of training efforts over
time. In this paper, it is assumed that the training cost function looks as follows:15
(2.9)
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Equation (2.9) implies that the training cost function is convex. Furthermore, the higher th
learning ability, the faster the training efforts decrease with job tenure. That is, the higher
the learning ability, the more convex the training cost function is.
Substituting (2.8) and (2.9) into (2.7) and solving yields the following earnings function:
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) has the same functional form as equation (2.4):
(2.4)
Comparing (2.4) and equation (2.10) yields the following identities:
(2.11)
and:
(2.12)
Equation (2.11) shows that, given the quality of the training concerned , the degree of
mismatch  determines the initial training effort and costs . Equation (2.12) shows
the link between the initial wage  and the long run wage . Substituting (2.11) into
(2.12) yields equation (2.5):
(2.5)
which shows that the difference between the initial wage and the long run wage is equal to
the quality of the match measure.
The total training costs, which have to be made in order to bring a worker on the long run
productivity level, can be derived from the training cost function (2.9):
(2.13)
Substituting (2.8) into (2.13) yields:
(2.14)
16. In footnote 2 a recent study by Oosterbeek and Webbink has been mentioned. This study is
not used here, because it discusses no aggregate results, but rate of return estimates by
gender only.
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Equation (2.14) shows that the total training costs are an increasing function of the degree
of mismatch and a decreasing function of the training quality and the learning ability.
In this section a model is formulated to investigate the relation between the quality of the
match, earnings and training. Section 3 pays more attention to the relation between th
quality of the match and initial earnings.
3  Measuring the quality of the match
3.1 Introduction
An important feature of the earnings model, which has been formulated in section 2, is the
assumption that the initial wage is an increasing function of the quality of the match
between the worker's educational background and the occupation in which he is employed.
The difference between the long run wage and the initial wage can be considered to be a
monetary measure of the quality of the match. However, section 2 did not clarify the
relation between this monetary measure and the degree of alignment between the skills
acquired in the type of education and the skill required in the occupation concerned. This
section formulates a method to investigate this relation.
The quality of the match has two dimensions: the skill level and the subject of the skills.
Therefore, this section consists of two parts. First, the relation between the initial wage
within an occupation and the educational level is discussed. In the second place, attention
is paid to the degree of alignment between the educational subject and the occupational
field. This element is added to the model describing the relation between the initial wage
and the educational level.
3.2 The educational level and the initial wage
In the job matching literature attention has been paid to the consequence of a mismatch
between required and acquired skills on the rate of return on education. These studie
focus on the effect of the educational level. Table 3.1 shows the estimation results of five
studies: Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Sicherman (1991), Van Smoorenburg and Van der
Velden (1995), Cohn and Khan (1995) and Sloane et al. (1995).16
R rc
R
OE>0 OE<0 OE'0
17. For more details, see Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988).
18. Note that Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Sicherman (1991), Cohn and Khan (1995) and Sloane
et al. (1995) have estimated the rate of return on required years, years overeducated and years
undereducated, while Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden (1995) have considered the
required years as the reference and have estimated the difference between the rate of return on
years required on the one hand and the years under- or overeducated on the other hand.
19. With regard to the rate of return on education required, Sloane et al. make a distinction
between five educational levels. The figure shown here is the rate of return on the third level.
The rates of return vary form 8.5% on the lowest level to 46.8% on the highest level.
20. Note that in this paper two types of rate of return are distinguished. In the first place, the rate
of return on education   and the rate of return on training .
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Table 3.1
Studies on the rate of return on education
H&O S S&V C&K S,B&S
education required 0.071 0.048 ref 0.077 0.178
undereducation -0.025 -0.017 -0.022 -0.038 -0.034
overeducation 0.057 0.039 -0.027 0.049 0.028
The figures presented in table 3.1 should be interpreted as follows. Take, for example,17
Hartog's and Oosterbeek's (H&O) estimates. The rate of return on years of education
required is 7.1%. Years overeducated yield a positive return also. However, the rate of
return on overeducation is lower than on years required (5.7% instead of 7.1%). Further-
more, being undereducated implies that the rate of return on additional schooling is 2.5%
lower compared with the rate of return on being adequately educated. In other words, the
rate of return is 4.6%. Table 3.1 shows that Sicherman (S), Van Smoorenburg and Van der
Velden (S&V),  Cohn and Khan (C&K) and Sloane et al. (S,B&S)  find comparable18 19
results. The rate of return on years required is higher than the rate of return on both under-
and overeducation. Furthermore, the more recent studies show that the rate of return on
years undereducated may be higher than on years overeducated (Van Smoorenburg and
Van der Velden and Sloane t al.). Cohn and Khan conclude the opposite, however. They
find that the rate of return on years overeducated is 4.9%, while being undereducated
implies that the rate of return is 3.9%.
From table 3.1 it can be concluded that the rate of return  on both years overeducated
( ) and years undereducated ( ) is lower than on years required ( ).20
Furthermore, the rate of return on years overeducated may be lower than on years unde-
reducated, although the estimates are not unambiguous. Figure 3.1 summarizes these
conclusions. These rate of return estimates imply that, in a particular job, the
MMij
16
undereducated earn much less, while the overeducated earn only slightly more than those
whose educational level is in alignment with the requirements.
An important weakness of these studies is the fact that the optimal educational level,
under- and overeducation are defined by means of subjective or indirect methods, which
focus on determining the 'optimal' level. Therefore, these rate of return studies are restric-
ted. First, the quality of the match can not be determined objectively. Second, these studies
only focus on the difference between the rate of return on adequate schooling on the one
hand, and under- or overeducation on the other. The methods which are used in these
studies to determine the optimal educational level imply that they are not able to measure
the degree of over- and undereducation. Therefore, the rate of return on education can not
be related to the degree of under- or overeducation. Figure 3.1 reflects this drawback.
Irrespective of the degree of under- or overeducation, the rate of return is constant.
Figure 3.1
Estimates of the rate of return on education: conclusion
The aim of this section is find a method to use the monetary mismatch measure  to
determine the quality of the match between acquired and required skills. In other words, the
aim is to find a measure for the degree of under- or overeducation. Before describing the
method, two remarks have to be made. First, attention has to be paid to the terms 'perfect
match' and 'comparative advantage'. A distinction has to be made between the type of
i i(
i i( Rij
i j
i(
Rij '
Wij,0 & Wi(j,0 & EC i
EC i
Wij,0 & Wi(j,0 EC i
EC i
17
education which matches perfectly with a particular occupation and a type of education
which has a comparative advantage in the occupation concerned. The perfect match is a
partial concept; it simply indicates that the acquired and required skills are perfectly in
alignment. Comparative advantage, however, indicates the degree of alignment compared
with other types of education. The concepts under- and overeducation are used in a
comparative advantage context here. This means, for example, that overeducation implies
that the educational level is higher than the educational level which has a comparative
advantage in the occupation concerned. Second, the concept of 'rate of return on
education' has to be defined properly. Take two types of education  and . Type of
education  has a higher level than . In the context of this paper, the rate of return  o
type of education   for an individual employed in occupation , already having type of
education , is equal to:
(3.1)
The rate of return is equal to the ratio of, on the one hand, the difference between the
wage gain  and the educational costs  and, on the other hand, the educa-
tional costs .
The method to measure the quality of the match is based on the conclusions drawn from
the rate of return studies mentioned above. These conclusions have been shown in figure
3.1. Furthermore, an additional assumptions is made. The rate of return is assumed to be
related to the degree of under- and overeducation. This assumption is shown in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2
Rate of return and the degree of under- and overeducation
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21. Note that the assumption is made that there is one unique level which has a comparative
advantage.
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The dotted lines in figure 3.2 are the same as the lines shown in figure 3.1. The continuous
lines reflect the assumptions made here. In the first place, if the individual is employed in
occupation , the highest rate of return  is achieved on the educational level which has
a comparative advantage. Secondly, the rate of return is a decreasing function of the
degree of under- or overeducation. Finally, the line describing the link between overeduca-
tion and the rate of return is steeper; the negative effect on the rate of return on overedu-
cation is greater than the effect on undereducation.
Figure 3.2 can be described by means of the following equation:
(3.2)
in which  is the level of type of education  and  is the educational level which has
a comparative advantage in occupation .  Equation (3.2) contains three parameters. The21
assumptions described by figure 3.1 imply that these parameters are assumed to have the
following characteristics. In the first place, ; if an individual has the educational
level which has a comparative advantage in the occupation concerned, the rate of return on
his educational efforts are maximal. Second, ; both under- and overeducation
have a negative effect on the rate of return. Third, ; the negative effect of
overeducation on the rate of return is greater than the negative effect of undereducation.
In order to translate the degree of under- or overeducation into the monetary mismatch
measure , the impact of under- and overeducation on the wage has to be measured.
Equation (3.1) describing the link between initial wages and the rate of return can be used
here. If the assumption is made that the educational costs are constant and not related to
the educational level, then:
(3.3)
This implies by definition:
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(3.4)
Substituting (3.4) into equation (3.2) and solving yields:
(3.5)
In order to obtain a continuous wage function, the following assumptions have to be made:
(3.6a)
and:
(3.6b)
Substituting (3.6a) and (3.6b) into (3.5) and rewriting yields equation (3.7), which describes
how the initial wage is related to the degree of over- or undereducation:
(3.7)
Now the link with the mismatch measure  can be made. As stated before, a distinction
has to be made between the type of education which matches perfectly and the type of
education which has a comparative advantage. In other words, if a type of education has 
comparative advantage in a particular occupation, the acquired skills may not match
perfectly with the required skills. Now define:
(3.8)
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Furthermore, as stated before:
(2.5)
Substituting (2.5) and (3.8) into the wage equation (3.7) yields the relation between the
monetary mismatch measure and the degree of over- or undereducation:
(3.7')
In figure 3.3 the mismatch equation (3.7') is drawn. Figure 3.3 shows that the curve is S-
shaped. The monetary mismatch measure is not a linear function of the degree of
alignment between the required and the acquired skills. Furthermore, the function is no
symmetric; the negative effect of undereducation on the initial wage is assumed to be
greater than the positive effect of overeducation. The mismatch function has a point of22
inflection at . If an individual is undereducated, more education yields a
higher rate of return, while for overeducated more education implies a lower rate of return.
At the point of inflection, the rate of return is maximal; more education has a maximal
impact on the quality of the match and, therefore, on the wage.
Up till now, the impact of a mismatch between the level of a type of education and the level
of the required skills in an occupation on the wage is discussed. Skills have a second
dimension, however, the subject. In the remainder of this section the f cus is on adding the
subject to the model described above.
Figure 3.3
Measuring the degree of over- and undereducation by means of initial wages
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3.3 The subject of study and the initial wage
Adding the subject of the skills to the model causes several problems. First, in contradiction
to the level, the concept 'subject' is not ordinal. This implies that measuring the degree of
alignment between the subject of, on the one hand, the acquired skills and, on the other
hand, the required skills is difficult. In the second place, the question arises wether the
impact of a mismatch with regard to the subject is related to the degree of mismatch with
regard to the level. This relation may be complex. For example, is a gap between the
subject of the acquired and the required skills a more serious problem for the higher skilled,
or not? Third, studies dealing with the impact of mismatch with regard to the subject are
rare.
Therefore, in this paper a simple approach is chosen. The underlying idea is comparable
with the thoughts on which subsection 3.2 is based. It is assumed that, given the tasks
contents of the occupation concerned, there is one subject of study which has a compara-
tive advantage in the occupation. The rate of return on the types of education within this
subject is higher than the rate of return on other types of education of other workers in that
occupation. Because the concept subject is ordinal, the degree of alignment between the
subject which has a comparative advantage and the subject of other types of education is
assumed to play no role. Furthermore, the assumption is made that the size of the negative
effect of a mismatch with regard to the subject on the rate of return is not related to the
level of the skills.
Equation (3.7') can be considered to describe a model dealing with types of education
which subject is alignment with the occupation concerned. If  is defined as the subject
of study which has a comparative advantage in occupation , equation (3.9) describes the
consequences of a mismatch with regard to the subject for the rate of return:
(3.9)
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23. Implicitly it is assumed here that  .
24. Note that  is the wage paid to workers having an educational background which has a
comparative advantage with regard to both the level and the subject of study.
22
(3.11)
in which  is the rate of return on the level of the skills. A mismatch is assumed to have a
negative effect on the rate of return, which implies that .23
The specification of the effect of a mismatch with regard to the subject used here has the
following consequences. In the first place, no distinction has to be made here between th
concepts of 'a perfect match' and 'a comparative advantage'. If a type of education has 
comparative advantage in the occupation concerned, the subject of study is perfectly in
alignment with the required skills. Second, the higher the educational level, the more
serious the mismatch between required and acquired skills is. Assume that a type of
education has a comparative advantage with regard to the level while the subject of study
is not alignment with the requirements in occupation . Then:24
(3.10)
More general, the initial wage difference between a type of education which subject
matches and a type of education which subject does not match, while both types of
education are of the same level is equal to . This implies that equation (3.7') can be
extended to incorporate the subject of study:
In figure 3.4 the extended mismatch equation (3.11) is shown. Figure 3.4 shows that if the
subject of study is not in alignment with the requirements ( ), the monetary mis-
match measure is higher than if there is a perfect match between the subject of th
acquired and the required skills ( ). Figure 3.4 shows also that the higher th
educational level, the more serious a subject mismatch is. The hig r the educational level,
the more skills are acquired and the more serious a mismatch is (in absolute terms).
23
In section 2 a model is formulated which describes the relation between the quality of the
match, training and earnings. The model in section 3 pays more attention to the monetary
mismatch measure which has been derived in section 2 and the degree of alignment
between required and acquired skills. The models formulated in section 2 and 3 are tested
in the remainder of this paper. In section 4 the models will be transformed into testable
models.
Figure 3.4
The extended mismatch equation
4 Towards an empirical model
4.1 Introduction
Up till now, the theoretical framework of this paper has been described. This framework
consists of two parts. In the first place, the relation between the quality of the match,
training and earnings. In the second place, the method to determine the quality of the
match between acquired and required skills by means of initial wages. This section deals
with the instruments which are used to investigate the validity of the framework empirically.
This section consists of three parts. First, some variables to which earnings are related are
added to the model. Second, a linear approximation of the earnings function (2.4), which
Wij,t ' W
p
j & MMije
&LAIit MMij, LAIi $ 0
W pj
j W pj
Whij,t ' W
p
j % Xhj$ & MMije
&LAIit MMij, LAIi $ 0
Whij,t h i
j xhj
24
plays a central role in this paper, is derived. Furthermore, some hypotheses with regard to
the signs and magnitudes of the parameters are formulated. Finally, the method which is
used to investigate the relation between the quality of the match and training is discussed.
4.2 Determinants of the wage
In section 2 a model is formulated which describes the relation between the wage on the
one hand and the educational background of the worker and the occupation in which he is
employed, on the other hand. It was shown, that in the short run, both the educational
background and the occupation concerned are important. In the long run, however, the
educational background plays no role anymore with regard to the productivity in an occu-
pation. Differences in productivity between workers having various types of education have
then disappeared by means of additional training. The earnings function (2.4) reflects this
distinction between the short and the long run:
(2.4)
in which  is the long run wage which is paid to a worker whose skills match perfectly
with the skill required in occupation . If the firm is price-taking and profit-maximising 
also reflects the (marginal) productivity of the 'perfectly matching worker'. In practice,
however, the productivity and earnings in a job are not only determined by the degree of
alignment between the acquired and required skills. Beside the educational background
and the occupation, there are other worker and job characteristics which are related to the
productivity and earnings. Therefore, in this paper, the earnings are assumed to be related
to some worker and job characteristics apart from the occupation. Therefore, equation (2.4)
is reformulated as follows:
(4.1)
in which  is the wage earned by individual  with educational background  employed
in occupation . The vector  reflects the worker and job characteristics which are used
as explaining variables of the wage. Gender and the marital status are the worker charac-
teristics which are added to the model. The job characteristics which are added are: the
industry in which the worker is employed, the distinction between the private and the public
sector, the firm size, hours worked (that is, full-time or part-time) and the distinction be-
tween permanent and temporary work.
25. For an overview of research on earnings functions and arguments to include particular
explanatory variables in the model, see, for example, Psacharopoulos (1987) or Ehrenberg
and Smith (1994).
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Arguments to include particular variables in the earnings function can especially be found
in the human capital literature. The link between earnings, training and the turnover rate25
plays an essential role. In this paper the emphasis is on the link between mismatch and
training. There are other determinants of the training efforts, however. The higher the
(expected) rate of return on training, the greater the training efforts and the higher earnings
will be. The rate of return on training is, for example, linked with ability and the turnover
rate.
Gender and the marital status are the worker characteristics which are added to the model.
Mincer (1989) states that women receive less training than men. An explanation for this
finding may be that employers expect women to have a higher turnover rate than men. As
a result, for women earnings are expected to be lower than for men. The marital status h s
a similar effect. If a worker is married, the turnover rate is expected to be lower (Mincer,
1989).
The following arguments can be used to explain the inclusion of the job characteristics
mentioned above. Large firms are able to offer more training facilities to their workers
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). Furthermore, the turnover rate may be lower in a larger firm.
Therefore, in large firms earnings are expected to be higher. Empirical research shows,
indeed, that training efforts are positively related to the size of the firm (Mincer, 1989). An
analogue argument can be used to include the length of the contract into the model. Being
temporarily employed implies a higher turnover rate and a lower expected rate of return on
training. Therefore, it may be reasonable to assume that temporarily employed workers
receive lower earnings. In the literature dealing with earnings functions, hours worked is
often used as a explaining variable (see Psacharopoulos, 1987). Adding the hours worked
to the model may be done for two contradictory reasons. On the one hand, part-time
workers may have a higher hourly productivity level, because they may work more inten-
sively. On the other hand the rate of return on training may be lower because a part-time
worker by definition never will have as much time as a full-time employed worker to profit
from his training efforts. In other words, earnings for part-time workers may be both higher
or lower than the wage for full-time workers. Finally, two industry variables are added.
These variables are often used in the earnings function literature (see Psacharopoulos,
1987). In the first place,  a distinction is made between the private and the public sector.
Second, several industries are distinguished. These variables are included to take differen-
ces between industries with regard to earnings into account.
4.3 An empirical model of the earnings function
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26. An expansion about is used, because the emphasis in this paper is on the mismatch
between occupations and types of education and, consequently, the earnings of workers
without experience in the job concerned. The derivation of this equation can be found in
appendix 1.
27. Note that using a second-order Taylor-series implies that the remaining elements of th
infinite Taylor-series are included in the error term .
26
A linear approximation
The earnings equation (4.1) shows the relation between the wage on the one hand a d job
tenure on the other. Unfortunately, this equation is not linear in the parameters. In this
paper, a linear approximation by means of a Taylor's series is used. If the earnings function
(4.1) is expanded in a second-order Taylor's series about , the following equation can
be obtained:26
(4.2)
The hypotheses
By estimating equation (4.3):27
(4.3)
the theoretical framework described above can be analysed empirically. Equation (4.3)
contains three parameter sets. In the first place , which is a measure for the long run
wage . In the second place, the parameters ,  and . These parameters determi-
ne the relation between job tenure on the one hand and the actual wage on the other hand.
In the third place, the parameters which make up the vector . These parameters measure
the relation between the worker and job characteristics on the one hand and the wage on
the other hand.
The parameter  is expected to be an increasing function of the occupational level. The
higher the occupational level, that is: the higher the skill requirements, the higher the (long
run) productivity will be. With regard to the parameters ,  and , the following two
hypotheses are formulated. In this paper the emphasis is on , which is an estimator of
the mismatch measure . Section 3 yields the hypotheses with regard to . First,
 may expected to be negative; a mismatch between required and acquired skills has a
negative effect on the wage. Second, an S-shaped relation between  and the educa-
tional level has been derived, which has been shown in figure 3.3. Furthermore, in figur
3.4 it has been shown that, given the educational level, is higher if the subject of
study is not in alignment with the requirements. So, it may be expected that, within an
occupation, the relation between and the educational level is S-shaped. Furthermore, if
the subject of a type of education is not in alignment with the occupation concerned, (the
absolute value of)  will be higher.
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28. A derivation of this equation can be found in appendix 1.
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The second parameter,  is expected to be positive; due to on-the job training and job-
related training, job tenure  is expected to have a positive effect on the wage. Further-
more, equation (4.4) shows that  can be considered to be an estimator for the
learning ability index :
(4.4)
In section 2 it has been stated that it may be expected that  is positively related to the
educational evel. Finally,  is expected to be negative; that is the earnings function is
expected to be concave.
With regard to the parameters of the vector , subsection 4.2 yields the hypotheses. Being
male and being married may have a positive effect on earnings. Furthermore, being
employed in a large firm also may have a positive effect. In a large firm, the wage is
expected to be higher. Being permanently employed is also expected to have a positive
effect on the wage. The effect of being employed part-time may be both positive or nega-
tive. Finally, determining the effect of the industry in which the worker is employed is
difficult and is likely to be related to the occupation concerned.
4.4 An empirical model of the training cost function
In section 2 it has been assumed that the training costs  are a decreasing function of
job tenure:
(2.9)
As stated before, according to the human capital theory, there is a close link betwee
training efforts and earnings. Therefore, the control variables added to the earnings functi-
on are also used here. To simplify the analysis an additive model is used:
(4.5)
Analogous to the earnings function, a second-order Taylor-series can be used to approxi-
mate the training cost function (4.5) in order to make it linear in the parameters:28
(4.6)
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29. More information can be found in Allaart et al. (1993).
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Equation (4.6) contains the unknown variable .  Remind, however, that in section
equation (2.11) has been derived:
(2.11)
Re-arranging (2.11) and substituting into (4.6) yields:
(4.7)
So, by estimating equation (4.8):
(4.8)
the theoretical training cost function can be tested empirically.
With regard to the parameters in equation (4.8), the following hypotheses can be formula-
ted. In the first place,  is expected to be positive; the training costs are expected to be
positively related to the degree of mismatch between the occupation and the type of
education concerned. In the second place, the training costs are assumed to be a decrea-
sing, convex function of job tenure. This implies that  is assumed to be negative and 
is expected to be positive. The parameters which make up the vector  are expected to
have the same signs as the parameters of the vector . Males and married workers are
expected to receive more training. Furthermore, workers employed in a large firm, workers
who have a permanent contract and workers who are full-time employed are expected to
receive more training. Finally, the industry variables are added to take industrial differences
with regard to the training efforts into account.
5  The data
5.1 The data set
The OSA labour supply survey is used here for the empirical analysis. This survey includes
data with regard to the Dutch labour market in general and the labour market behaviour of
the (potential) labour force in particular. The survey deals with individuals who are between
16 and 65 years old and do not attend full-time education. It is a panel data set of which the
respondents are surveyed biennially. For this paper the survey of 1992 is used. The
number of respondents was 4,536. For this paper a selection of respondents is used. This29
selection includes those who have a paid job, are not self-employed and are graduated.
30. From a theoretical point of view, using gross wage figures would be more preferable. Unfortu-
nately, these figures were not available. Two control variables which are used enable to take
differences with regard to the tax burden into account: the martial status and the number of
hours worked.
29
Excluding the respondents whose labour market position (especially the occupation in
which they are employed and the educational background) are not known, implies that
finally 2,039 individuals remain in the data set used here.
A few remarks have to be made with regard to the variables used. In the first place, the
wage variable used here is the full-time equivalent of the net monthly wage. That is, it is the
net monthly wage if a worker would be employed full-time (that is, working a forty-hour
week).  Job tenure is defined as the number of years experience in the occupation con-30
cerned. The other variables used in the wage equation are dummies. A worker is conside-
red to be part-time employed if he works less than 33 hours a week. A firm is considered to
be large if more than 50 people are employed. The dummies for gender, martial status, 
permanent contract and the distinction between public and private sector require no further
explanation.
With regard to three variables, the classification is important. In the first place, 7 economic
industries are distinguished. This classification is based on the Standard Industry Classifi-
cation 1978 of Statistics Netherlands, which is related to the International Standard Industry
Classification (ISIC), on the one-digit level. The occupational classification is based on th
Standard Occupation Classification 1984 of Statistics Netherlands. On the one-digit level,
this classification distinguishes ten main occupational groups. Furthermore, 7 occupational
levels are distinguished. These levels are based on a classification of the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment. The educational classification is based on the Standard
Educational Classification 1978 (SOI 1978) of Statistics Netherlands, which is related to the
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). In this classification 6
educational evels are distinguished. With regard to the subject a classification developed
by ROA is used (see, for example, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market,
1993). In this classification 4 subjects are distinguished. More details with regard to these
classifications can be found in appendix 2.
Finally, attention has to be paid to the training variable. In the theoretical framework, the
training costs play an important role. The aim was to approximate these costs by means of
a training efforts measure: the time spent on training. Unfortunately, the data on this
variable are unsatisfying; the number of respondents who gave information on the training
efforts was rather low. Therefore, the choice has been made to use a dummy variable as
dependent variable in the training equation. A distinction is made between those worker
31. The argument for this restriction can be found in the human capital theory, which states that
those who don't bear the risk have to make the training costs. This implies that the firm bears
the costs of job-related training. This argument has first been made by Becker (1964).
32. The seven occupational and five educational levels which are distinguished in table 5.1 are
also used in the empirical analysis in section 6 (see appendix 2).
33. The classification used here is based on the classification used in the empirical analysis in
section 6 (see appendix 2). However, no distinction is made between general and commerce
on the intermediate educational level here.
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who receive training and those who don't. Furthermore, in order to have a proxy for job-
related training, only training which is paid by the firm is taken into account.31
5.2 Some descriptive statistics
One of the starting-points for this paper was the notion that a mismatch with regard to the
required skills (the occupation) and the acquired skills (the educational background) is a
well-known phenomenon on the labour market. Table 5.1 illustrates this phenomenon by
investigating the level of the skills.32
Assume that skills on respectively a low, intermediate and high level match with jobs on a
low, intermediate and high level. Then table 5.1 shows that both under- and overeducation
are important phenomena on the labour market. For example 35.6% of the workers having
primary education (educational level 2) work on an intermediate level or higher (occupati-
onal level 3 or higher), while 10.5% of the academic graduates (educational level 6) ar
employed on an intermediate level (occupational levels 3 and 4).
Table 5.1
The occupational level by the educational level of workers in 1992 (in percents)
occupational level
educ. level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
primary education18.6 43.8 22.4 7.6 3.8 1.8 - 100.0
LGSE & PVE 11.9 23.8 26.6 19.2 10.5 7.2 1.0 100.0
HGSE & IVE 4.2 14.0 24.9 24.2 17.3 12.8 2.7 100.0
HVE - 4.7 8.8 6.8 16.9 47.3 15.5 100.0
academic education- - 7.9 2.6 2.6 52.6 34.2 100.0
all levels 7.9 19.2 22.6 17.6 12.9 15.4 4.2 100.0
Source: OSA
Table 5.2 illustrates the mismatch with regard to the subject.33
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Table 5.2
Occupational field by subject of study of workers in 1992 (in percents)
occupational field
subject of study gen./comm. tech./agr. arts/care total
general and commerce 55.6 26.1 18.3 100.0
technical and agricultural 16.1 74.6 9.2 100.0
arts and community care 20.4 10.2 69.3 100.0
all subjects 36.1 36.7 27.2 100.0
Source: OSA
Table 5.2 shows that mismatch with regard to the subj ct is also an important phenomenon
on the labour market. For example, 25.3% of the workers with an technical or agricultural
background are employed in jobs which can not be characterised as technical or
agricultural.
An important assumption on which the training model of section 2 was based was th
training cost function (2.9):
(2.9)
Equation (2.9) reflects the assumption that job-related training is a decreasing function of
job tenure. As stated before in this paper a binary variable is used as training variable. In
table 5.3 the link between job tenure and the share of workers who receive training is
described.
Table 5.3
Job tenure and the share of workers who receive training in 1992 (in percents)
job tenure (in years)
0-4 5-8 > 8
share receiving training 43.9 39.9 38.2
Source: OSA
Table 5.3 shows that the share of workers receiving training indeed seems to be a decre-
asing function of job tenure.
Finally, in table 5.4 a list of descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses of this
paper is given.
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Table 5.4
List of descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation)
variable mean SD
monthly wage (in Dutch guilders) 2676.44 1413.23
job tenure (in years) 16.4 11.1
worker characteristics
male (%) 63.3
married (%) 69.7
educational background
primary (%) 10.3
lower general secondary and preparatory vocational
general and commerce (%) 17.3
technical and agricultural (%) 15.3
community care (%) 5.8
higher general secondary and intermediate vocational
general (%) 7.3
technical and agricultural (%) 10.7
commerce (%) 9.7
community care (%) 7.3
higher vocational
commerce (%) 3.4
technical and agricultural (%) 2.8
arts and community services (%) 8.2
academic
commerce (%) 0.3
technical and agricultural (%) 0.3
arts and community services (%) 1.2
job characteristics
industry
agriculture and manufacturing (%) 19.2
electricity, gas and water (%) 1.6
construction (%) 7.2
trade (%) 16.6
transport (%) 7.2
private services (%) 10.4
other services (%) 37.9
large firm (%) 52.9
private firm (%) 72.5
part-time job (%) 26.6
permanent job (%) 89.4
Source: OSA
Whij,t ' "j % Xhj$ % 21,ij % 22,ijt % 23,ijt
2 % uhij
Whi,t ' Xh$ % 21,i % 22,it % 23,it
2 % uhi
34. This implies that comparative advantage plays an important role. Another option is a specifica-
tion in which occupational and educational characteristics determine earnings independently.
This specification is often referred to as the assignment model.
35. Note that equation (6.1a) is identical to equation (4.3).
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6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Introduction
In this section the empirical results are analysed. This section consists of four parts. In the
first place, remind that the theoretical framework is based on the basic assumptions of the
job matching. Therefore, the performance of the earnings model based on the assumption
that both occupational and educational background characteristics determine earnings (job
matching theory) is compared with the performance of the more restricted models. These
more restricted models include, respectively, occupational (job competition model) and
educational background characteristics only (human capital theory). Secondly, the estima-
tes of the tenure-earnings profile by occupational level are presented. Thirdly, this profile is
estimated by occupational field. Finally, the link between training efforts and the quality of
the match is discussed. Investigating this link empirically enables to underpin the earnings
model of section 2.
6.2 Testing three alternative earnings models
The basic notion of this paper that the mismatch between the skills required in an occupa-
tion and the skills acquired in a type of education can be measured by means of investi-
gating the initial wage of workers with the educational background concerned who are
employed in that particular occupation. This basic idea relies heavily on the job matching
theory. Therefore, following Hartog (1985), the starting-point for the empirical analysis is to
investigate the performance of three alternative specifications of the earnings model. In the
first place, the model which is used in this paper which is based on the job matching theory.
In this model the educational background and the occupation determine the relation
between earnings and job-tenure interactively:34,35
(6.1a)
In the second place, a model based on the human capital theory; the educational back-
ground is the only determinant of the relation between earnings and job-tenure:
(6.1b)
Whj,t ' Xhj$ % 21,j % 22,jt % 23,jt
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Finally, if the educational background plays no role, while the occupation in which the
worker is employed determines the effect of job-tenure on earnings, the model is in accor-
dance with the job competition model:
(6.1c)
In the context of this analysis, the terms 'type of education' and 'occupation'  refer to the
level only. The subject is not taken into account. This choice is made to make the results
comparable with previous research, which has for example been described by Hartog
(1985,1992) Table 6.1 describes the performance of respectively the job competition, th
human capital and the job matching specification of the earnings model.
Table 6.1
The performance of three specifications of the earnings function
specification
job competition model 0.23
human capital theory 0.28
job matching theory 0.32
Table 6.1 shows that the job matching specification fits better than both the job competition
and the human capital specification. Comparing the job competition and the job matching
specification yields an F-statistic of 3.19, while comparing the human capital and the job
matching specification yields an F-statistic of 1.72. Both statistics are significant at the 1%-
level. These findings are in alignment with previous research. It may be concluded that
using the assumptions underlying the job matching theory in general and the principle of
comparative advantage in particular is a reasonable starting-point for a further empirical
analysis.
6.3 The earnings function by occupational level
The estimation results
In the OSA labour supply survey, 7 occupational levels are distinguished. In appendix 2 can
be found that these seven levels can be aggregated to obtain three categories: unskilled
and jobs on a low level (level 1 and 2), jobs on an intermediate level (level 3 and 4) and
complex jobs (level 5,6 and 7). For each of these categories a separate earnings function
(4.3) is estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares. In table 6.2 the estimation results
are presented. Note that the highest educational level acts as the reference level. 
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Table 6.2
Tenure-earnings profiles by occupational level (net monthly wages in f.t.e in Dutch guilders)
occupational level
low intermediate complex
variable parametert-value parametert-value parameter t-value
2062.72 9.23 2554.63 3.23 3705.59 10.03** ** **
primary education-1164.97 -5.13 -1594.43 -2.72 -2478.82 -1.81** **
LGSE & PVE -1023.66 -5.44 -1065.43 -2.38 -2097.58 -4.49** * **
HGSE & IVE -657.07 -3.18 -907.02 -2.19 -2064.82 -6.07** * **
HVE ref -720.67 -1.81 -1898.73 -5.46**
academic education - ref ref
job tenure
primary education 61.87 3.79 116.18 2.13 128.34 1.07** *
LGSE & PVE 63.98 5.11 95.58 3.29 43.82 1.10** **
HGSE & IVE 23.17 1.33 73.31 2.55 94.04 3.20* **
HVE ref 96.06 1.48 100.26 3.30**
academic education - ref ref
job tenure squared
primary education -0.97 -2.81 -2.03 -1.73 -2.02 -0.90**
LGSE & PVE -1.08 -3.53 -1.87 -2.58 -0.14 -0.17** **
HGSE & IVE 0.16 0.37 -1.16 -1.55 -1.65 -2.26*
HVE ref -2.15 -1.22 -1.00 -1.36
academic education - ref ref
male 279.83 3.70 331.99 2.36 783.66 5.51** * **
married 168.00 2.35 -19.61 -0.14 59.61 0.48*
industry
agr. & manufacturingref ref ref
electr,. gas & water-129.68 -0.36 -121.09 -0.33 -167.83 -0.39
construction -114.17 -1.04 -291.94 -1.41 -247.80 -0.90
trade -122.18 -1.66 242.47 1.31 -11.92 -0.05
transport 307.53 3.53 -73.83 -0.29 99.26 0.34**
private services 26.28 0.19 11.98 0.06 271.40 1.48
other services -12.08 -0.14 -134.70 -0.77 -209.01 -1.18
large firm 154.88 2.80 135.03 1.22 161.65 1.55**
private firm -45.78 -0.52 -52.02 -0.34 -201.33 -1.49
part-time job 93.05 1.24 356.29 2.34 766.69 4.82* **
permanent job 199.27 2.49 -152.42 -0.89 -92.14 -0.46*
Adjusted 0.39 0.16 0.24
N 554 820 665
 = significant at 5%-level,  = significant at 1%-level* **
MMij'0
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36. Note that these figures reflect the relative mismatch compared with the reference level.
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This implies that the additional assumption is made that the skills which the workers with
the educational background concerned have are perfectly in alignment with the require-
ments for the occupation concerned (that is, )
The discussion of these estimation results is split up into four parts: the mismatch measure
and the long run wage, job tenure, learning ability and the other determinants of the wage.
The mismatch measure and the long run wage
The hypotheses with regard to the link between the mismatch measure and the
educational level were shown in figure 3.3. The (absolute value of) the mismatch measure
is expected to be a decreasing S-shaped function of the educational level. Figure 6.1
shows the estimation results by occupational level:36
Figure 6.1 
The mismatch between occupational and educational levels
Figure 6.1 shows that the mismatch measure is a decreasing function of the educational
level. That is, the higher the educational level, the more the acquired and required skills are
in alignment. Furthermore, for every educational level, there is a negative link between the
quality of the match and the occupational level. That is, the more complex the job is, the
smaller the degree of alignment between acquired and required skills. Table 6.2 shows that
almost all the estimates are significant at the 5%-level. There is one exception: the degree
W pj
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of mismatch between primary education and complex jobs is not significant, due to the
small number of cases.
Especially with regard to the complex jobs, figure 6.1 also reflects the S-shape of the link
between the mismatch measure and the educational level. Remind that the point of inflec-
tion of the curve determines the educational level which has a comparative advantage.
Figure 6.1 shows clearly that academic graduates have a comparative advantage in
complex jobs. With regard to the jobs on a low and an intermediate level the picture is less
clear, however. The point of inflection of the curve for low jobs may be around the HGSE-
and IVE-level, while for the intermediate level the point of inflection may be somewhere
around or just above the HVE-level. So, it might be concluded that academic graduates
have a comparative advantage in complex jobs, workers with HVE-background at the
intermediate job level and workers with a HGSE- or IVE-background in jobs on a low level.
More evidence with regard to the S-shape can be obtained by investigating the significance
of differences between mismatches of successive educational levels. With regard to jobs
on a low level, only the difference between the mismatch with primary education and
LGSE- and PVE is not significant. These findings confirm the statement that the point of
inflection of the curve is about the HGSE- and IVE-level. This would imply that HGSE and
IVE have a comparative advantage in low jobs. On the intermediate level, no differences
between successive educational levels are significant. Table 6.2 shows that the difference
between HGSE and IVE on the one hand and academic education is significant. This
implies that the point of inflection may be around the HVE-level. Finally, with regard to
complex jobs, only the difference between HVE and academic education is significant,
which is also an indication for the statement that academic graduates have a comparative
advantage in these jobs. 
Remind that the intercept can be interpreted as a measure for the wage which is paid if the
acquired skills are perfectly in alignment with the requirements. The intercept is in all three
equations significantly different from zero. Furthermore, conform the hypothesis,  is an
increasing function of the job level.
 
Job tenure
Earnings are assumed to be an increasing function of job tenure. The estimation results
confirm this hypothesis. The parameters reflecting the impact of job tenure on earnings are
positive. In seven cases the parameter is significantly positive. Furthermore, the earnings
function is expected to be concave. Although less convincing, this hypothesis is confirmed
also. Apart from workers having a HGSE- or IVE-background employed in jobs on a low
level, the parameter reflecting the concavity of the earnings function is negative. However,
only four parameter are significant. It may be concluded that the estimation results are in
alignment with one of the basic ideas of the earnings model presented in this paper. The
22/&21
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quality of the match between the required skills and the acquired skills by means of formal
education and job-related training is an increasing function of job tenure. Furthermore, th
empirical findings confirm that the productivity increase becomes lower if job tenure incre-
ases. In section 6.5 below the assumption that training efforts are the most important factor
in explaining these tenure-wage profiles is investigated.
The learning ability index
Remind that  can be considered to be an estimator for the learning ability index
. In section 2 it has been stated that it may be expected that  is positively related to
the educational level. Table 6.3 shows the estimation results for the learning ability index.
Table 6.3
The learning ability index
occupational level
educational level low intermediate complex
primary education 0.053 0.073 0.052+ +
LGSE & PVE 0.063 0.089 0.021+ +
HGSE & IVE 0.035 0.081 0.046+ +
HVE - 0.133 0.053+
On first sight, these results seem to be rather unsatisfying. However, if the emphasis is on
those figures which underlying parameters are both significant the estimates yields quite
interesting results. These figures are marked with a .In the equation concerning jobs on a+
low level the parameters for primary education and LGSE and PVE are significant. Table
6.3 shows that the learning ability estimate for the LGSE- and PVE-level is higher than for
primary education. For jobs on an intermediate level, the picture is less satisfying. The
learning ability of workers with a HGSE or IVE-background seems to be lower than for
LGSE- and PVE-graduates. Again the learning ability of those who finished primary edu-
cation is lower than the learning ability of the rest of the workforce. Finally, workers with a
HVE-background employed in complex jobs have a higher learning ability than workers with
a HGSE- or IVE-background. Two conclusions may be drawn. In the first place, the learning
ability of workers who have finished primary education is low compared with the rest of the
workforce. In the second place, the learning ability of HVE-graduates is relatively high
compared with the rest of the workforce.
Other determinants of the wage
Both individual and job characteristics are included in the earnings function. With regard to
the individual characteristics the empirical results show that the wage for males is signifi-
cantly higher than for females. This finding confirms the hypothesis. It is also expected that
MMij
37. This finding may be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis that increasing returns to scale
especially occur on low job levels.
38. In order to obtain more reliable results, the five educational levels used in the previous analy-
ses have been aggregated. Three educational levels are distinguished: low (primary educati-
on), intermediate (LGSE, PVE, HGSE and IVE) and high (HVE and academic education).
39. In table 6.4 the intercept is also shown. Because jobs are aggregated over levels in this analy-
sis, this intercept should be interpreted as the average long run wage for jobs in the occupatio-
nal field concerned. 
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being married has a positive effect on earnings. This hypothesis is confirmed for low jobs
only.
The empirical results show that the wages do not differ between industries. Only workers
employed in the transport industry at the low job level earn a significantly higher wage than
workers employed in other industries at the lowest level. There is no significant difference
between the private and the public sector also. Furthermore, it is expected that workers
employed in a large firm receive higher earnings than workers employed in small firms.
Table 6.2 shows that this hypothesis can be confirmed for jobs at the low job level only.37
The same conclusion can be drawn with regard to the effect of being permanently em-
ployed. Only at the low job level the hypothesis that being permanently employed has a
positive effect on earnings can be confirmed. Finally, measured in f.t.e.'s, part-time workers
earn significantly more at both the intermediate and the complex job level. This finding can
be considered to confirm the notion that having less working hours implies that the (expec-
ted) productivity per hour is higher.
6.4 The earnings function by occupational field
In section 3 it has been shown that one of the merits of the approach presented in this
paper is the possibility to introduce the dimension 'subject' in the analysis. This enables to
investigate the degree of alignment between occupations and types of education with a
different subject. In appendix 2 is described that, both with regard to occupations and types
of education three fields or subjects are distinguished: general and commerce, agricultural
and technical and arts and community care. In this subsection the estimation results of th
earnings function by occupational field are presented. In contradiction to the analysis by
occupational level, the estimates of the mismatch measure are discussed here only,
because the results with regard to the other variables do not differ essentially form the
analysis presented in table 6.2. The complete estimation results can be found in appendix
3.
The mismatch measure by subject
Table 6.4 shows the estimation results for the mismatch measure  by subject.38,39
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Table 6.4
The mismatch measure by subject
occupational field
gen./comm. agr./tech. arts/ care
type of education parametert-value parametert-value parameter t-value
intercept 3187.41 4.67 2545.26 10.87 2781.48 12.37** ** **
low -1908.08 -1.98 -2298.30 -5.37 -2041.82 -6.39* ** **
intermediate
gen./comm. -1431.34 -4.86 -1114.97 -6.53 -1524.57 -8.29** ** **
agr./tech. -1677.12 -5.24 -990.73 -4.51 -1819.54 -9.73** ** **
arts/comm. care -1753.25 -5.19 -1520.19 -7.61 -1687.06 -8.77** ** **
high
gen./comm. ref ref ref
agr./tech. -273.28 -0.55 544.28 2.49 -0.93 -0.00*
arts/comm. care -420.84 -0.80 47.31 0.21 128.19 0.71
 = significant at 5%-level,  = significant at 1%-level* **
Looking at the estimates presented in table 6.4, the following conclusions can be drawn.
Workers with a general or commercial educational background are confronted with a lower
degree of mismatch in the general and commercial occupational field than other workers.
The absolute value of the mismatch measure (1431.34 on the intermediate and 0, by
definition, on the high level) is lower than for other types of education on the same level.
The estimates with regard to the technical and agricultural occupations show comparable
results concerning workers with a technical or agricultural educational background. The
initial wage of these workers is higher than the wage earned by unexperienced workers
with a different educational background. In the arts and community care occupational field,
the picture is less clear. On the intermediate educational level, the skills acquired by
workers with a general or commercial background show relatively the best alignment with
the requirements. On the highest level, this is the case for workers graduated from a type
of education in the arts and community care sector. Finally, the table shows that, on
average, the quality of the match is an increasing function of the educational level. Be-
cause the job level is not taken into account, it is not possible here to draw conclusions with
regard to the possession of comparative advantage by a particular educational level,
however.
Remind that in section 4 it has been stated that, given the educational level,  is
expected to be higher if the subject of study is not in alignment with the requirements.
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40. In table 6.5 the following abbreviations are used:
GC = general and commercial types of education;
AT = agricultural and technical types of education;
AC = types of education dealing with arts and community care 
41. For example, with regard to general and commercial occupations, the difference between the
degree of mismatch for agricultural and technical types of education on the one hand and types
of education dealing with arts and community care on the other hand is less important.
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Therefore, it is useful to analyse the differences between the mismatch measure on a
particular educational level. In table 6.5 an overview of these differences is given.40
Table 6.5
Differences in the degree of mismatch
occupational field
gen./comm. agr./tech. arts/ care
parametert-value parametert-value parameter t-value
intermediate level
-245.78 -2.01 124.24 0.88 -294.97 -3.05* **
-321.91 -2.14 -405.22 -3.30 -162.49 -1.37* **
-76.13 -1.21 -529.46 -2.96 132.48 1.09**
high level
-273.28 -0.55 544.28 2.49 -0.93 -0.00*
-420.84 -0.80 47.31 0.21 128.19 0.71
-147.56 -0.32 -496.97 -1.96 129.13 0.42*
 = significant at 5%-level,  = significant at 1%-level* **
In table 6.5 those figures which are most important to analyse the validity of the hypothesis
that, if the subject of study is not in alignment with the requirements,  will be higher are
printed in italics. Table 6.5 yields the following conclusions.41
The signs of the figures concerning the general and commercial occupations are in
alignment with the hypothesis. Both on the intermediate and the high level, the mismatch
measure for the general and commercial types of education is lower than for the other
types of the education. Unfortunately, the differences are not significant on the high edu-
cational level. With regard to the agricultural and technical occupations the evidence which
underpins the hypothesis is more convincing. On the high educational level the (unexpe-
rienced) workers with a technical or agricultural educational background earn a significantly
higher wage. The skills acquired by graduating from these types of education are more in
alignment with the requirements than the skills acquired by graduating from the other types
of education. On the intermediate educational level, the difference with the types of educa-
tion dealing with arts and community care is significant only. So, the initial wage for workers
with a general or commercial educational background is not significantly lower than for
workers who graduated from an agricultural or technical type of education. Finally, three out
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of four figures concerning the occupational field 'arts and community care' have a sign
which is alignment with the hypothesis. The finding that workers with a general or commer-
cial background yield a higher initial wage than workers who graduated from a type of
education dealing with arts and community care has not been expected. Unfortunately, the
differences are not significant.
It may be concluded that the figures presented in table 6.5 give some evidence with regard
to the validity of the hypothesis that, given the educational level,  is expected to be
higher if the subject of study is not in alignment with the requirements. Two remarks have
to be made, however. In the first place, the significance level is rather low for the estimates
concerning the types of education on the highest educational level. This finding may be
due to the small number of respondents who graduated on a high level. In the second
place, the significance level for the estimates concerning the general and commercial types
of education is rather low. The following explanation may be given for this finding. The
occupational sector may include jobs in which management skills are required, which
implies that workers with a commercial background are more suited for these jobs. This
may also explain the finding that, in the technical occupations, technical graduates do not
earn significantly more than commercially educated on the intermediate level. To state it
more generally, the aggregation level used here may be too high, which implies that both
the occupational and educational classification used here is too heterogeneous to yield
reasonable results. Unfortunately, the data set used here is too small to enable to use a
lower aggregation level. With this explanation in mind, we have decided to estimate the
training function with the results of the analysis by occupational level only.
6.5 The training cost function
Section 6.3 has shown that estimating the earnings function by occupational level yields
results which are in alignment with the model described in this paper. The estimates have
shown that the degree of mismatch is a decreasing function of the educational level.
Furthermore, for each occupational level the model enables to find the educational level
which has a comparative advantage. Finally, the estimates confirm the hypothesis that
earnings are an increasing, concave function of job tenure.
Estimating the training cost function (4.8) enables to investigate the validity of the theore-
tical framework described in section 2. Before the estimation results are presented, a few
remarks have to be made. In the first place, remind that, due to data limitations, the choice
has been made to use a dummy variable as dependent variable in the training equation. A
distinction is made between those workers who receive training and those who do not.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the mismatch measure estimates presented in tabl
6.2 and figure 6.1 are used to estimate the training function. In the third place, the squared
job tenure is removed because there is a high correlation between the variables  and
ˆMMijt
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P tr
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42. The correlation is equal to 0.95.
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.  Finally, making the parameters both occupation- and type of education specific,42
did not yield significantly better results. This implies that differences in the effect of job
tenure on training is determined by the mismatch measure only. Therefore, one aggregated
training equation is estimated.
The assumption is made that the probability to receive training  can be estimated by
means of the following binomial logit model (6.2):
(6.2)
The estimation results, which are obtained by means of Maximum Likelihood are shown in
table 6.6.
Table 6.6
The probability to receive training
variable parameter Wald-statistic
intercept -1.31 11.60**
 / 1000 0.41 8.87**
 * job tenure / 1000 -0.01 11.04**
male -0.19 1.41
married 0.14 0.91
industry
agriculture and manufacturing ref
electricity, gas and water 0.42 0.99
construction 0.48 3.15
trade 0.14 0.51
transport 0.40 2.37
private services 0.21 0.83
other services 0.20 0.93
large firm 0.11 0.61
private firm -0.20 1.50
part-time job -0.47 7.44**
permanent job 0.72 9.91**
-2 Log Likelihood 1658.61
 = significant at 5%-level,  = significant at 1%-level* **
Table 6.6 shows that the estimated degree of mismatch  between the occupational
and educational level concerned has a significant positive effect on the probability t
$i $ˆ2i /Fˆ
2
$ˆi
P2
43. The significance has been calculated by means of the Wald-statistic, which is, for a parame-
ter , equal to , which has a -distribution.
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receive training. This finding is in alignment with the theoretical framework. The greater43
the gap between acquired and required skills, the more job-related training is required to
bring the worker concerned on the long-run productivity level.
Secondly, the table shows that the probability to receive training slightly decreases with job
tenure. This parameter is significant also. This estimated effect of job tenure on the pro-
bability to receive training, is also in accordance with the theoretical framework. There is an
incentive for both firms and workers to concentrate he training efforts immediately after the
recruitment. However, in order to enable a worker to benefit from learning-by-doing also,
the training efforts will not take all at once. This results in a training pattern in which training
efforts decrease with job tenure.
The individual characteristics, gender and martial status, do not have a significant impact
on the probability to receive training. This implies that the positive effect of being male on
the wage found in table 6.2 can not be explained by means of a higher probability to
receive training. This finding also that the hypotheses formulated in section 4.4 can not be
confirmed. With regard to the job characteristics included, the following conclusions can be
drawn. In the first place, there are no significant differences between the industries. This
finding is in alignment with the earnings function presented in table 6.2, which shows that
earnings do not differ between industries also. The same conclusion can be drawn with
regard to the distinction between the private and the public sector. Being employed in a
large firm has an effect neither, which is also in alignment with the earnings function
estimates. Being part-time and temporary employed both have a negative effect. Both
results are in alignment with the hypotheses formulated in section 4.4. Being temporarily or
part-time employed implies a higher turnover rate, which may result in a lower probability to
receive training.
It may be concluded that the training data confirm the theoretical framework presented in
this paper. The probability to receive training is an increasing function of the mismatch
between the occupational level on which a worker is employed and the level of the worker's
educational background. Furthermore, job tenure has a negative effect on the probability to
receive training.
7 Conclusions
In this paper a model has been developed which fits in the job matching tradition. Earnings
are assumed to be related to both the educational background of the worker and the job in
which the worker concerned is employed. The aim of the paper has been twofold. In the
45
first place, to find an explanation for the mismatch phenomena which can be found on the
labour market. By emphasising the nontransparency of the labour market, a theoretical
framework has been developed in which a firm faces a trade-off between search and
training costs. As a result a profit-maximising firm may decide to hire a worker whose skills
are not in alignment with the required skills. Job-related training is required to enable th
worker to achieve a satisfying productivity level.
Applying this theoretical framework has three important implications. In the first place,
training costs are assumed to be positively related to the degree of mismatch between
required and acquired skills. In the second place, it is possible to derive the well-known
concave earnings-tenure profiles. Finally, the estimated initial wage in an earnings-tenure-
profile can be interpreted as a measure for the quality of the match between acquired and
required skill. This brings us by the second aim the paper. By estimating earnings-tenure
profiles by occupation an endogenous measure is created, which enables to investigate the
quality of the match between occupations and types of education and to find that particular
type of education which has a comparative advantage in the occupation concerned.
By estimating earnings function by occupational level and occupational field the theoretical
framework has been tested empirically. The hypothesis that the earnings-tenure profile is
concave can be confirmed by the estimates. Furthermore, the estimates of the mismatch
measure yield attractive results, especially concerning the quality of the match between
occupational and educational levels. Finally, estimating a training function confirms the
hypothesis that training efforts are positively related to the degree of mismatch. So, it may
be concluded that the approach which has been developed in this paper yields a useful
mismatch measure.
The approach developed here has some attractive features. In the first place, concerning
the mismatch measure, the approach enables to determine both the character and the
degree of mismatch endogenously. In the second place, from a theoretical point of view, i
is relatively easy to introduce the dimension 'subject' into the analysis. These are important
differences with previous rate of return studies, which focus on the level and determine he
optimal level exogenously. Furthermore, the mismatch measure has the attractive feature
that it is cardinal.
On the other hand, the approach also causes a few problems. The data requirements are
relatively high. Therefore, we have decided to use a high aggregation level in this paper.
With regard to the analysis by occupational level, this still yields interesting results. Espe-
cially with regard to the analysis by subject, however, the informative value of the analysis
is relatively low. More detailed data sets are required to obtain useful information regarding
the quality of the match between specific occupations and types of education.
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Appendix 1 Derivation of the Taylor approximations
Taylor's theorem states that a function  can be approximated about  by means of
the following infinite power series:
(A.1)
In this paper Taylor's theorem is applied to both the earnings function (4.1) and the training
cost function (4.5).
The earnings function looks as follows:
(A.2)
In order to obtain a second order power series which can be used as an approximation of
the earnings function about ,  and the first and the second derivative for  have
to be calculated:
(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)
Substituting (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) into (A.1) yields:
(A.6)
in which  are the elements of the infinite series (A.1) which are not taken into account.
Equation (A.6) is similar to equation (4.2).
The training cost function looks as follows:
(A.7)
In order to obtain a second order power series which can be used as an approximation of
the training cost function about ,  and the first and the second derivative for 
have to be calculated:
(A.8)
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(A.9)
(A.10)
Substituting (A.8), (A.9) and (A.10) into (A.1) yields:
(A.11)
which is similar to equation (4.6).
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Appendix 2 Classifications
In this paper 7 industries are distinguished:
1. agriculture and manufacturing;
2. electricity, gas and water;
3. construction;
4. trade;
5. transport;
6. private services;
7. other services;
There are 7 occupational levels which can be described as follows:
1. unskilled occupations;
2. skilled occupations with requirements on a low level;
3,4 skilled jobs with requirements on a intermediate level. Level 4 requires more
practical experience
5,6,7 highly skilled jobs. Requirements vary from complex to theoretical knowledge
on an academic level
These 7 levels are aggregated to obtain three categories: jobs on a low level (level 1 and
2), jobs on a intermediate level (level 3 and 4) and complex jobs (level 5,6, and 7).
Ten occupational sectors are distinguished:
0. educational occupations;
1. cultural occupations;
2. agricultural occupations;
3. technical and industrial occupations;
4. transport occupations;
5. medical and paramedical occupations;
6. commercial and administrative occupations;
7. socio-cultural occupations;
8. hotel, catering and service occupations;
9. public security and safety occupations.
These sectors are aggregated to obtain three categories which are based on the educati-
onal classification described below: general and commercial occupations (sector 0,4 and
6), agricultural and technical occupations (sector 2 and 3) and, finally, occupations in arts
and community care (sectors 1,5,7,8 and 9).
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The educational classification is based on the SOI 1978, in which 6 educational levels are
distinguished. In this paper the respondents with the lowest educational background (no
education) are excluded from the analysis. The educational classification looks as follows:
2. primary education;
3. lower general secondary education (LGSE) and preparatory vocational education
(PVE);
- general and commerce;
- technical and agricultural;
- community care;
4. higher general secondary education (HGSE) and intermediate vocational education
(IVE);
- general;
- technical and agricultural;
- commerce;
- community care;
5. higher vocational education (HVE);
- commerce;
- technical and agricultural;
- arts and community services;
6. academic education;
- commerce;
- technical and agricultural;
- arts and community services.
R 2
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Appendix 3 Tenure-earnings profiles by occupational field (net monthly
wages in f.t.e. in dutch guilders)
occupational field
gen./comm. agr./tech. arts/ care
variable parametert-value parametert-value parameter t-value
intercept 3187.41 4.67 2545.26 10.87 2781.48 12.37** ** **
type of education
low -1908.08 -1.98 -2298.30 -5.37 -2041.82 -6.39* ** **
intermediate
gen./comm. -1431.34 -4.86 -1114.97 -6.53 -1524.57 -8.29** ** **
agr./tech. -1677.12 -5.24 -990.73 -4.51 -1819.54 -9.73** ** **
arts/comm. care-1753.25 -5.19 -1520.19 -7.61 -1687.06 -8.77** ** **
high
gen./comm. ref ref ref
agr./tech. -273.28 -0.55 544.28 2.49 -0.93 -0.00*
arts/comm. care -420.84 -0.80 47.31 0.21 128.19 0.71
job tenure
low 51.93 0.52 137.10 3.48 72.92 2.63** **
intermediate 96.50 2.61 46.09 3.17 62.24 4.39** ** **
high ref ref ref
job tenure squared
low -0.31 -0.14 -2.04 -2.32 -1.30 -2.26* *
intermediate -1.45 -1.59 -0.18 -1.32 -1.02 -2.95**
high ref ref ref
male 493.61 1.73 748.25 7.87 719.19 6.92** **
married -85.44 -0.36 124.93 1.41 219.59 2.61
industry
agr. & manufacturingref ref ref
electr,. gas & water 6.13 0.01 61.51 0.22 144.49 0.51
construction -224.13 -0.39 -27.10 -0.11 -138.83 -1.61
trade 38.67 0.13 -136.27 -1.02 -130.16 -1.13
transport 443.39 0.66 -358.76 -2.64 104.88 0.73**
private services 550.84 1.52 -105.73 -0.90 253.99 1.26
other services 17.19 0.05 -36.80 -0.29 -79.88 -0.70
large firm 322.17 1.47 23.27 0.31 124.22 1.82
private firm -25.12 -0.10 10.02 0.10 -316.88 -3.26**
part-time job 496.70 1.80 19.58 0.20 456.87 4.77**
permanent job -501.48 -1.65 291.94 2.44 190.43 1.72*
Adjusted 0.12 0.41 0.29
N 474 556 1009
 = significant at 5%-level,  = significant at 1%-level* **
